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CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY COLLIDE
WITH COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE-THE NEW
DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE INDEMNITY
INTRODUCTION
Within the last three years California tort law has under-
gone a profound change brought about by the switch from con-
tributory negligence to comparative negligence. As the dust
settled around the new system it became increasingly apparent
that the switch to comparative negligence encompassed much
more than merely allowing plaintiffs who are partially at fault
to recover part of their damages. To the contrary, the adoption
of comparative negligence in Li v. Yellow Cab Co.,' to the
dismay of many practicing attorneys, raised more questions
than it answered, leaving their solutions to the trial and appel-
late courts.2 One of the unanswered questions referred to in the
Li decision was what effect comparative fault has upon Califor-
nia's existing methods of allocating tort loss among multiple
defendants. The purpose of this comment is to focus on the
systems of contribution and indemnity and to explain the prob-
lems they exhibit in a comparative negligence context.
This comment shall first examine the historical develop-
ment of the parallel doctrines of contribution and indemnity.
Then it will demonstrate how the recently adopted compara-
tive negligence system challenges the underlying basis of the
two doctrines. It will then set forth the solutions proposed in
three recent California appellate decisions. Finally, it will dis-
cuss and criticize the California Supreme Court's solution pro-
pounded in American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court,3 and
suggest some alternatives to be considered in the future.
DEVELOPMENT OF INDEMNITY AND CONTRIBUTION
Joint Tortfeasors at Common Law
At common law there existed no right to allocation or ap-
portionment of damages among concurrent tortfeasors.4 Since
1. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
2. Id. at 823, 532 P.2d at 1239-40, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 871-72.
3. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 574 P.2d 763, 143 Cal. Rptr. 692 (1978).
4. Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 Term. Rep. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799);
See, e.g., Thornton v. Luce 209 Cal. App. 2d 542, 550, 26 Cal. Rptr. 393, 398 (1962);
42 C.J.S. Indemnity § 27(a) (1944).
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joinder of defendants as joint tortfeasors was strictly limited to
cases in which each tortfeasor was said to be acting in concert
with a common purpose to produce a single injury,5 a situation
closely resembling criminal conspiracy, the rule arose that the
courts would refuse to allow contribution among tortfeasors
because they were wrongdoers.' Each tortfeasor was liable for
the entire sum of the judgment and the release of one joint
tortfeasor effected the release of all others.7
Over the years the term "joint tortfeasor" was expanded
to include not only intentional wrongdoers, but also persons
whose conduct or product combined to cause damage.8 To tem-
per the harsh common law rule precluding any allocation of
damages among joint tortfeasors, courts and legislatures devel-
oped the doctrines of contribution and indemnity.
Contribution in California
Before the enactment of its contribution statute9 in 1957,
5. See Sir John Heydon's Case, 11 Co. Rep. 5, 77 Eng. Rep. 1150 (1613); W.
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 46 (4th ed. 1971).
6. See River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, & n.5,
103 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1972); W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 50.
7. Ellis v. Jewett Rhodes Motor Co., 29 Cal. App. 2d 395, 84 P.2d 791 (1938);
W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 49.
8. V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 252 (1974).
9. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 875-877 (West Supp. 1978). Throughout this article
the term "contribution statute" will refer to §§ 875-877 in their entirety. Section 875
provides:
(a) Where a money judgment has been rendered jointly against two or
more defendants in a tort action there shall be a right of contribution
among them as hereinafter provided.
(b) Such right of contribution shall be administered in accordance with
the principles of equity.
(c) Such right of contribution may be enforced only after one tortfeasor
has, by payment, discharged the joint judgment or has paid more than
his pro-rata share thereof. It shall be limited to the excess so paid over
the pro-rata share of the person so paying and in no event shall any
tortfeasor be compelled to make contribution beyond his own pro-rata
share of the entire judgment.
(d) There shall be no right of contribution in favor of any tortfeasor who
has intentionally injured the injured person.
(e) A liability insurer who by payment has discharged the liability of a
tortfeasor judgment debtor shall be subrogated to his right of contribu-
tion.
(f) This title shall not impair any right of indemnity under existing law,
and where one tortfeasor judgment debtor is entitled to indemnity from
another there shall be no right of contribution between them.
(g) This title shall not impair the right of a plaintiff to satisfy a judg-
ment in full as against any tortfeasor judgment debtor.
Section 876 provides:
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California followed the common law rule against allocation.
The courts 0 and a number of commentators" recognized the
inequities in the existing rule which allowed a plaintiff to re-
ceive a joint judgment against one of a number of defendants,
irrespective of the degree of that defendant's fault, intent, or
causation, and which then barred any attempt on the part of
the judgment debtor to secure even partial compensation from
other possibly more culpable persons.
To alleviate these inequities, the California legislature
adopted the concept of contribution to promote the equitable
sharing of costs among liable parties and to encourage settle-
ments by eliminating the harsh rule against allocation." The
statute provides that the right to contribution arises only when
(a) The pro rata share of each tortfeasor judgment debtor shall be deter-
mined by dividing the entire judgment equally among all of them.
(b) Where one or more persons are held liable solely for the tort of one
of them or of another, as in the case of the liability of a master for the
tort of his servant, they shall contribute a single pro rate share, as to
which there may be indemnity between them.
Section 877 provides:
Where a release, dismissal with or without prejudice, or a covenant not
to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith before verdict or
judgment to one or more of a number of tortfeasors claimed to be liable
for the same tort-
(a) It shall not discharge any other such tortfeasor from liability unless
its terms so provide, but it shall reduce the claims against the others in
the amount stipulated by the release, the dismissal or the covenant, or
in the amount of the consideration paid for it whichever is the greater;
and
(b) It shall discharge the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability
for any contribution to any other tortfeasors.
10. See, e.g., Thornton v. Luce, 209 Cal. App. 2d 542, 26 Cal. Rptr. 393,(1962).
11. W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 50, at 307; Comment, Contribution and
Indemnity, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 490, 516 (1969).
12. See SENATE INTERIM JUDICIARY COMM., THIRD PROGRESS REPORT TO THE
LEGISLATURE, 2 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE app., at 22 (1955).
13. See River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 991,
103 Cal. Rptr. 498, 503 (1972); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 875(b) (West Supp. 1978). The
California State Bar stated the following reasons for sponsoring the contribution bill:
The ancient basis of the rigid rule against contribution in this type of case
is the policy that the law should deny assistance to tortfeasors in adjust-
ing losses among themselves because they are wrongdoers and the law
should not aid wrongdoers. But this overemphasized the supposed penal
character of liability in tort; it ignores the general aim of the law for equal
distribution of common burdens and of the right of recovery of contribu-
tion in various situations, e.g., among cosurities. It ignores also the fact
that most tort liability results from inadvertantly caused damage and
leads to the punishment of one wrongdoer by permitting another wrong-
doer to profit at his expense.
Id. at 993 n.5, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 503 n.5 (quoting 1 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE app., at 130
(1957)).
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a joint money judgment has been rendered against more than
one defendant. 4 The right to contribution may be enforced
only after one defendant has paid the entire joint judgment or
has paid more than his prorata share of the judgment.'5 A pro
rata share is defined as an equal share.'6 Thus, if there are two
joint judgment debtors, they each pay half of the judgment; if
there are three, they each pay one-third. For the purposes of
contribution, the share of a party held vicariously liable for the
acts of another, such as a master's liability for the acts of his
servant, is considered to be one share. 7 Additionally, the com-
mon law bar to contribution among intentional wrongdoers is
retained.'8 In sum, the statute appears to stand for the proposi-
tion that there shall be an equal sharing of liability among
unintentional joint tortfeasors without regard to their relative
fault. 1
Indemnity in California
Indemnity is another doctrine which has evolved to temper
the often harsh results of the common law bar to allocation of
liability among tortfeasors. Essentially an all-or-nothing prop-
osition, it traditionally operated to shift the entire burden of
loss from one party to another. 2 Indemnity may be contractual,
implied from a contract, or implied from the nature of the
conduct of the respective parties.'
Contractual indemnity arises in those situations where an
express agreement exists between two or more parties under
which one party bears any burden of loss arising from the tor-
tious conduct of the parties. Implied contractual indemnity
arises in those circumstances where a contract exists between
two parties to perform services. 23 Under this doctrine, the legal
contractual relationship itself gives rise to a duty on the part
14. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 875(a) (West Supp. 1978); Barth v. B.F. Goodrich,
15 Cal. App. 3d 137, 145, 92 Cal. Rptr. 809, 814 (1971).
15. E.B. Willis Co. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. App. 3d 650, 653, 128 Cal. Rptr.
541, 544 (1976); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 875(a) & (c) (West Supp. 1978).
16. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 876(a) (West Supp. 1978).
17. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 876(b) (West Supp. 1978).
18. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 875(d) (West Supp. 1978).
19. See, e.g., River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 986,
993, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498, 503 (1972).
20. W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 51.
21. See Molinari, Tort Indemnity in California, 8 SANTA CLARA LAW., 159 (1968).
22. Id. at 159-60.




of the obligor to perform the contract without negligently in-
flicting damage upon a third person or his property. 4 Accord-
ingly, if the obligor negligently damaged a third party in the
course of performing and the third party sued the obligee, the
latter was entitled to indemnity so long as he was not a contrib-
uting cause of the damage."
Non-contractual implied indemnity has been the most
troublesome development in the indemnity area. Tradition-
ally, some legal relationship, such as a contract, was required
before any right of indemnity was recognized. 6 With time,
however, courts tempered that requirement, so that in the ab-
sence of a contract, a party seeking indemnity could rely upon
the equitable principles of unjust enrichment and restitution.27
It was generally held that non-contractual implied indemnity
shifted the entire burden of loss to the joint tortfeasor who was
adjudged more culpable. 8 For purposes of determining the
more culpable party, the courts developed several tests to as-
certain the relative negligence of each party. These included
characterizing the negligence of the concurrent tortfeasors as
"active" or "passive", "primary" or "secondary", and several
other similiarly imprecise formulations." The courts were not
able to reach a consensus on the correct test.
Contributions and Indemnity Compared
Since the concepts of contribution and implied indemnity
share certain characteristics and are therefore often confused,
it is important to note some key distinctions. While contribu-
tion in California apportions loss among joint judgment debt-
ors in equal shares,30 indemnity traditionally shifted the entire
24. See, e.g., San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. California Bldg. Maintai-
nance Co., 162 Cal. App. 2d 434, 440, 328 P.2d 785, 789 (1958).
25. Id. at 442, 328 P.2d at 792.
26. See Ramirez v. Redevelopment Agency, 4 Cal. App. 3d 397, 84 Cal. Rptr. 356
(1970); Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Lan Franco, 267 Cal. App. 2d 881, 886-
87, 73 Cal. Rptr. 660, 664 (1968); Cahill Bros. v. Clementina Co., 208 Cal. App. 2d 367,
370, 25 Cal. Rptr. 301, 305 (1962). But see Gardner v. Murphy, 54 Cal. App. 3d 164,
126 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1975); American Can Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, 202
Cal. App. 2d 520, 21 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1962).
27. See United Air Lines, Inc. v. Weiner, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964).
28. See id. at 399.
29. See, e.g., id. at 402; General Electric Co. v. State ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works,
32 Cal. App. 3d 918, 923,'108 Cal. Rptr. 543, 545 (1973). However, many courts seemed
to favor the active-passive formulation. Compare City and County of San Francisco
v. Ho Sing, 51 Cal. 2d 127, 330 P.2d 802 (1958) with Cahill Bros. v. Clementina Co.,
208 Cal. App. 2d 367, 25 Cal. Rptr. 301 (1962).
30. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 876(a) (West Supp. 1978).
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burden of loss from one defendant to another or to a third
party.3 Contribution exists by statute whereas indemnity is a
judicially created common law doctrine."2 Additionally, the
rights of indemnity and contribution among the same parties
are mutually exclusive: if a person is entitled to indemnity, the
right to contribution does not exist.3 Further, the right to con-
tribution presupposes that joint tortfeasors are in pari delicto,
or equally at fault, 4 while non-contractual implied indemnity
shifts the burden of liability to the party found to have the
greater fault. 5
As the foregoing analysis indicates, in determining wheth-
er there is a right to contribution, a court ignores the rela-
tive fault of the judgment debtors as among themselves and
simply allocates the burden of loss in equal shares to each one.
However, in determining whether a right to non-contractual
implied indemnity exists, a court must scrutinize the relative
fault of the parties. This "fault assessment" is perhaps the
most dramatic difference between the two concepts, and
played a key role in two cases which relaxed the total loss-
shifting principle that ruled the common law approach to in-
demnity.
Non-Contractual Implied Indemnity Revisited
In 1964, a California court of appeal added an interesting
variation to the doctrine of non-contractual implied indemnity.
In Herrero v. Atkinson," a woman was negligently injured in
an automobile accident. She died a year and a half later as a
result of a negligently administered blood transfusion in the
course of an operation necessitated by the auto accident. There
was no legal relationship between the defendant driver and the
medical defendants, save that both sides contributed to the
death.
Both parties were actively negligent in their separate acts.
31. W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 51.
32. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Weiner, 335 F.2d 379, 398 (9th Cir. 1964). For an
excellent discussion of the judicial development of indemnity, see Molinari, supra note
21.
33. See Herrero v. Atkinson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 74, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490, 493
(1964); CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 875(f) (West Supp. 1978).
34. Herrero v. Atkinson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 73, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490, 492 (1964).
35. See Alisal Sanitary Dist. v. Kennedy, 180 Cal. App. 2d 69, 75, 4 Cal. Rptr.
379, 383 (1960). Parties in pari delicto were not able to recover by way of indemnity.
Herrero v. Atkinson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 74, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490, 493 (1964).
36. 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490 (1964).
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Nevertheless, the court allowed indemnity in favor of the negli-
gent driver and against the doctors and hospital for "that
portion of the damages caused by their own negligent
conduct."37 In support of its conclusion the court cited Ash v.
Mortensen," which stands for the proposition that an initial
tortfeasor is a proximate cause of damages resulting from sub-
sequent medical malpractice, and is liable for the doctor's neg-
ligence as well as his own. However, the court went on to say
that "[t]here is no reason why the ultimate burden of dam-
ages should not be distributed among the various defendants,
and each be made to bear that portion of the judgment which
in equity and good conscience should be borne by him."39
Thus, under an indemnity theory, the court of appeal ap-
proved the apportionment of damages between tortfeasors per-
forming separate acts of negligence that combined to produce
a single injury. Contrary to the traditional distinction drawn in
non-contractual implied indemnity cases between "active"
and "passive" tortfeasors, the court did not find one party more
"actively" negligent than the other, but held that each should
be liable for damages caused by his own negligence. Recently,
a California court of appeal reached a similar result in Niles v.
San Rafael.'
In 1972, the New York Court of Appeals, in Dole v. Dow
Chemical Co.,4 propounded an equally interesting variation to
the doctrine of non-contractual implied indemnity. Dow was
charged with negligently labeling a poisonous fumigant which
caused the death of plaintiff's decedent." Dow filed a third-
party complaint for indemnity against decedent's employer al-
leging active and primary negligence in failing to follow in-
structions on the label, for allowing an untrained worker to
perform the fumigation, and for failing to ventilate and test the
enclosure after fumigation. The court reversed the dismissal
of the third-party complaint and rejected the traditional
"active-passive" test."
In rejecting the traditional test, the court went on to say
that while indemnity was traditionally an all-or-nothing rule,
37. Id. at 75, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 493 (emphasis added).
38. 24 Cal. 2d 654, 657, 150 P.2d 876, 877 (1944).
39. 227 Cal. App. 2d at 75, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
40. 42 Cal. App. 3d 230, 116 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1974).
41. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
42. Id. at 146, 282 N.E.2d at 290, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 385.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 147, 153, 282 N.E.2d at 291, 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 386, 392.
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"[t]here are circumstances which would justify apportion-
ment of responsibility between third-party plaintiff and third-
party defendant, in effect a partial indemnification."'5 The
court reasoned that since the all-or-nothing rule of indemnity
often achieves as equally unfair a result as the strict common
law rule, indemnity itself should be tempered to achieve a more
equitable result."
Since the courts provided no guidelines except general
equitable considerations for allowing partial indemnity, most
of them, even after Herrero and Dole, refrained from apportion-
ing loss under an indemnity theory. 7
Thus, in General Electric Co. v. Department of Public
Works,"8 the court refused to modify the all-or-nothing rule of
indemnity. In this case, General Electric's (G.E.) employee
negligently collided with one plaintiff's automobile, sending it
across an island and into a head-on collision with an oncoming
vehicle. G.E. cross-complained against the county and state for
maintaining a dangerous and defective condition and asserted
causes of action for partial indemnity, contribution and
"equitable apportionment.''4
In sustaining demurrers to all three theories articulated in
the cross-complaint, the court distinguished Herrero as a case
involving two separate accidents. The court concluded that the
facts in the present case were "but one continuous chain of
events proximately resulting from the active and primary neg-
ligence of cross-complainant's driver. ... 1'In support of this
determination, the court cited Builders Supply Co. v.
McCable,5' which set forth the rule that a party may be indem-
nified if, and only if, his fault is imputed or constructive." This
rule is clearly inconsistent with the results reached in cases
such as Herrero, Dole, and Niles, where active tortfeasors were
partially indemnified.
Based on the preceding cases, it seems fair to conclude
that the pre-Li v. Yellow Cab Co.53 law governing implied in-
45. Id. at 147, 282 N.E.2d at 291, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 386 (emphasis added).
46. Id. at 149-50, 282 N.E.2d at 292-93, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 387-88.
47. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Robert J. Poeschl, Inc., 21 Cal. App. 3d 694, 697-
98, 98 Cal. Rptr. 702, 704-05 (1971).
48. 32 Cal. App. 3d 918, 108 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1973).
49. Id. at 921, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 544-45.
50. Id. at 924, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 547.
51. 336 Pa. 322, 77 A.2d 368 (1951).
52. 32 Cal. App. 3d at 923, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 546.
53. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
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demnity was anything but settled. Cases like Herrero and
Niles, which allowed partial indemnity, were distinguishable
from those that did not on the grounds that in the former, the
harms suffered by the injured parties were disparate in time
and the damages caused by each tortfeasor were separate and
identifiable." The lack of definiteness in these distinctions left
courts free to abandon the strict all-or-nothing rule whenever
a situation somehow appeared to lend itself more easily to allo-
cation of loss among different causes. However, it was virtually
impossible to predict whether or not a court would cross the
line and allow partial indemnity in a particular case.
Both loss allocation systems, indemnity and contribution,
produced inequitable results by virtue of their rigid and some-
times unpredictable applications. Neither system based a tort-
feasor's liability for damages on the degree of his fault. Never-
theless, the absence of equitable loss sharing was not glaring
in a contributory negligence system that also emphasized an
"all-or-nothing" approach. However, both concepts would be
called into question when the California Supreme Court issued
its landmark decision in Li v. Yellow Cab Co.
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE AND Loss ALLOCATION
Li v. Yellow Cab Co.
In 1975, the California Supreme Court decided the case of
Li v. Yellow Cab Co.55 disposing of the all-or-nothing rule of
contributory negligence" and replacing it with "pure" compar-
ative negligence.57 The switch to comparative negligence brings
up a number of issues in various areas of tort law." In its
54. These are the considerations set forth in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
433A (1966):
Apportionment of harm to causes:
(1) Damages for harm are to be apportioned among causes where
(a) there are distinct harms, or
(b) there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution
of each cause to a single harm.
(2) Damage for any other harm cannot be apportioned among two or
more causes.
Most courts have limited application of this doctrine to nuisance actions where the
sources of pollution were fixed and measurable.
55. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
56. Before Li, any negligence on the part of the plaintiff barred recovery. Id. at
809-10, 532 P.2d at 1230, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
57. Id. at 808, 532 P.2d at 1229, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 861. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra
note 8, at 1.5, Special California Supp., at 1-5.
58. 13 Cal. 3d at 823-26, 532 P.2d at 1232-43, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 871-73.
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judicial enactment of the new system, the court resolved some,
but not nearly all, of the issues associated with such a radical
change. One such problem, which the court mentioned without
resolving, is how to reconcile the principles of comparative neg-
ligence with the existing methods of dealing with multiple tort-
feasors.55
The doctrine of pure comparative negligence was chosen
by the court over any modified system of comparative negli-
gence because it is more equitable. It allocates loss between a
plaintiff and a defendant purely on the basis of relative fault."
Another reason which the court enumerated for choosing
"pure" comparative negligence over any modified system was
that it is easier to administer because it avoids the difficulty
of requiring a jury to determine whether the plaintiff was more
at fault than the defendant. Thus, by specifically rejecting
any modified system of comparative negligence, the court em-
phasized that its decision is founded upon the proposition that
liability should be charged in direct proportion to fault.
In the aftermath of Li, a question naturally arose concern-
ing whether or not its principle of liability charged in propor-
tion to fault could be squared with the two systems that allo-
cated loss among multiple defendants.
Impact of Li on Contribution
When the California legislature enacted the contribution
statute it expressed an intent to promote the equitable sharing
of costs and facilitate settlement of litigation.2 The former goal
is accomplished by dividing the judgment debt equally among
One of the issues which the California Supreme Court recently addressed was the
applicability of comparative negligence to strict liability actions. Among other things,
the court held that a plaintiff's fault should offset his recovery against a strict liability
defendant. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
59. 13 Cal. 3d at 823, 532 P.2d 1239-40, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 871-72.
60. "ITihe fundamental purpose of [pure comparative negligence] shall be to
assign responsibility and liability for damage in direct proportion to the amount of
negligence of each of the parties." Id. at 829, 532 P.2d 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875. See
generally V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, Special California Supp., at 2.
61. One of the modified systems mentioned by the court was the 50% system.
Under this system, a plaintiff whose negligence exceeds 50% is barred from recovery.
The court emphatically disposed of this alternative, saying: "Numerous reversals have
resulted on this point, leading to the development of arcane classifications of negli-
gence according to quality and category." 13 Cal. 3d at 828, 532 P.2d at 1243, 119 Cal.
Rptr. at 875 (1978).
62. CAL. CiV. Paoc. CODE § 875-877 & comments (West Supp. 1978); see River
Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1972).
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all the defendants joined in the lawsuit regardless of fault. 3
The latter goal is attained by allowing a defendant who settles
in "good faith" to obtain a complete release from further liabil-
ity.64
However, after Li, the statutory methods utilized in ac-
complishing both legislative goals were open to attack based on
the theoretical foundation of that case. Thus, if a jury made a
special finding that defendant A was 99% at fault and defen-
dant B was 1% at fault, under the contribution statute, each
defendant was obliged to pay half of the judgment. In contrast,
a special finding65 that the plaintiff was 99% at fault and defen-
dant was 1% at fault would, under the doctrine of Li, result in
each bearing a corresponding share of the liability. The plain-
tiff would recover 1% of the total damages.
Under the foregoing analysis, a plaintiff who is perhaps
more at fault than each of several defendants may recover that
portion of damages which he did not cause, while a defendant
guilty of minimal fault must pay a share equal to that of all
other defendants. That a defendant should bear responsibility
for damages in excess of the proportion of his fault seems to run
counter to the basic principle of Li.6 In cases where the conduct
of both the plaintiffs and defendants combines to cause injury
and a culpable plaintiff is permitted to recover, there seems to
be no compelling reason to apply different standards of loss
allocation. Yet, the contribution statute would appear to de-
mand this result.
Similarly, the principle of Li seems to pose problems with
respect to the contribution statute's settlement procedure.
According to section 877(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure, a
settlement of one tortfeasor "shall reduce the claims against
the others in the amount stipulated in the release ....
Clearly a settlement need not correspond to the degree of fault
of the settling tortfeasor.6 7 Thus, it is quite conceivable that a
63. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 876(a) (West Supp. 1978).
64. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 877 (West Supp. 1978).
65. See CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 625 (West 1976).
66. Syllabus, 1975 Annual Conference of California Judges, panel on
"Comparative Negligence in California," at 4. Professor John W. Wade stated the
following objection to the California contribution statute: "[E]qual distribution of
the liability is simply inconsistent with the concept of comparative fault and, while
perhaps possible, it is not truly workable." Amicus Curiae Brief for Petitioner at 2,
Safeway, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, Inc. 63 Cal. App. 3d 934, 134 Cal. Rptr. 150 (1976), hearing
granted, 1 Civ. No. 39038 (Feb. 11, 1977).
67. See River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 993,
103 Cal. Rptr. 498, 503 (1972).
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non-settling defendant could end up paying a far greater share
of the damages than he would if the other defendants had not
been released. Again, this result seems to run counter to the
message of Li that liability be assessed in direct proportion to
fault.
In addition to the procedure for loss sharing and settle-
ment, the theoretical foundation of Li potentially conflicted
with other aspects of the contribution statute as well. As noted
earlier, the statute requires first, that there be a joint money
judgment, and second, that one joint tortfeasor pay more than
a pro rata share of the judgment before any right to contribu-
tion arises. 8 Consequently, the statutory remedy of contribu-
tion is not available to a judgment debtor as against a third
person who, for one reason or another, could not be joined in
the lawsuit. 9 Contribution may only be asserted against a co-
defendant. Therefore, unless the named defendant could join
the third-party tortfeasor in the lawsuit under the California
compulsory joinder statute ° or by the cross-complaint provi-
sions of the Code of Civil Procedure,7 his only recourse would
be to sue the third party in a separate action for indemnity.
In the likely event that the judgment debtor is unable to
fulfill the traditionally rigorous requirements of asserting a
cause of action for implied indemnity, he would apparently be
without a remedy. Thus, the judgment debtor would again be
forced to pay not only his own share of the liability, but the
shares of all parties who could not be joined in the suit.
A similar problem arises when a tortfeasor is insolvent. If
a joint judgment is rendered against a tortfeasor and he is
unable to secure some form of allocation of the loss, either by
implied indemnity or by contribution, against an insolvent co-
68. See text accompanying notes 14 and 15, supra.
69. See also V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at § 16.2.
70. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 389 provides for compulsory joinder of any person not
joined in a lawsuit if "complete relief cannot be afforded among those already parties."
The comment to that section points out: "Basically the [1971 amendment] requires
joinder of persons materially interested in an action whenever feasible." The comment
goes on, however, to note that some joinders could defeat subject matter jurisdiction,
while others would be impossible because of lack of personal jurisdicton. Furthermore,
the other parties to the suit may successfully prevent such a joinder by arguing that
the new party tends to complicate plaintiff's case and interject new issues among the
cross-defendants. See General Electric Co. v. State, 32 Cal. App. 3d 918, 926, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 543, 548 (1973). See generally Friedenthal, Joinder of Claims, Counterclaims,
and Cross-Complaints: Suggested Revision of the California Provisions, 23 STAN. L.
Rxv. 1 (1970).
71. See generally note 132, infra.
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tortfeasor, the joint judgment debtor under the doctrine ofjoint
and several liability would be forced to pay the insolvent
party's share of the liability.
Impact of Li on Indemnity
The traditional all-or-nothing rule of implied indemnity
also presented problems when contrasted with Li's liability
apportioning principle. For example, suppose that a speeding
motorist injured a pedestrian in an intersection crosswalk
where the traffic light malfunctioned for lack of proper mainte-
nance. Assume that both the malfunction and the speeding
were proximate causes of the injury. Suppose further that
plaintiff sued only the city and that the city was unable, for one
reason or another, to procure joinder of the motorist in the
main action, thus barring the city's right to seek contribution.
After paying the judgment, the city commences a separate ac-
tion for indemnity against the motorist. If the city convinces
the court that it was only passively or secondarily negligent
under the traditional rule, it is entitled to indemnity for the
entire sum of the judgment regardless of its share of the fault.
Conversely, if the court finds the city actively or primarily
negligent, it gets nothing, again regardless of its actual propor-
tion of fault. Either result seems to contradict Li's "notion of
fairness" since it requires a joint tortfeasor to bear a greater or
lesser portion of a judgment debt than his own negligence ac-
tually occasioned.
In operation, the loss allocation rules of both the California
contribution statute and the traditional doctrine of implied
indemnity seemed to contravene Li's principle of pure compar-
ative negligence. Shortly after Li, three California courts of
appeal wrestled with the difficulties presented by both loss-
sharing systems. Each of the decisions proposed a different
solution based on different considerations. While none of the
decisions reached the solution drawn by the California Su-
preme Court in American Motorcycle, the divergent views they
represent demonstrate the multitude of considerations faced by
the high court. For this reason, the following section shall ana-
lyze those decisions.
ATTEMPTS TO RECONCILE COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE WITH
CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY
Stambaugh v. Superior Court
The first major case which attempted to reconcile Califor-
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nia's loss allocation systems with the doctrine of comparative
negligence was Stambaugh v. Superior Court."2 Stambaugh
involved a wrongful death action arising out of an auto accident
in which a corporate defendant cross-complained against the
plaintiff, Stambaugh. Stambaugh had settled with the plain-
tiff prior to the lawsuit in an amount equal to the full extent
of his insurance coverage.73 The corporate defendant sought to
have the "court determine the extent to which Stambaugh's
negligence proximately contributed to the death. . . and that
judgment against said cross-defendant be entered accord-
ingly."74 After the trial court denied Stambaugh's motion for
summary judgment or a judgment on the pleadings,75 Stam-
baugh sought a writ of mandate in the court of appeals to
effectuate his motion.
Two main issues relevant to loss allocation were presented
on appeal. The first was whether a defendant could join a set-
tling co-tortfeasor in a lawsuit as an "indispensable party"
under section 389 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the purpose
of determining to what degree his negligence contributed to the
damage." In response, the court concluded that section 877 of
the Code of Civil Procedure controls when a joint tortfeasor
settles a lawsuit discharging him "from all liability for any
contribution to any other tortfeasors."77 Although the cross-
complaint expressly denied that it was seeking indemnity or
contribution, 8 the court nevertheless reasoned that Stam-
baugh was forever discharged from any obligation arising from
the lawsuit. The court acknowledged that this result might
impose a disproportionate share of the damages upon a non-
settling tortfeasor,0 but then pointed out that the policy favor-
ing settlements was the overriding consideration."0
The second issue, closely related to the first, involved an
72. 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 132 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1976).
73. The court maintained that such settlement constituted a good faith settle-
ment as a matter of law. Id. at 238-39, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
74. Id. at 234, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 234-35, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
77. Id. at 235, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 845-46. Such a settlement provision is not part
of the traditional indemnity doctrine. Arguably, a non-settling defendant was able to
seek indemnity from a settling tortfeasor before the California Supreme Court incorpo-
rated the settlement provision into the doctrine of equitable indemnity. See text ac-
companying notes 129-31, infra.
78. 62 Cal. App. 3d at 235 n.1, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 845 n.1.
79. Id. at 235, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
80. Id. at 235-36, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 846. Contra, V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, § 16.5.
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apparent attempt by the corporate defendant to persuade the
appellate court to abandon the rule of joint and several liability
among joint tortfeasors. Thus framed, it concerned whether Li
should be interpreted "as holding that each of several contrib-
uting joint tortfeasors, whether or not joined as a defendant, is
liable to the plaintiff in damages, but only in the proportion
that his negligence bears to the total negligence (i.e., that of
all contributing joint tortfeasors and plaintiff) which proxi-
mately caused plaintiff's damages."81
The court declined to resolve the second issue since it
found that it affected the rights of parties not involved in the
mandamus proceedings and that the resolution of the joinder
issue was dispositive of the appeal.8 2 Interestingly, however, the
court added a conclusory statement upon which it did not elab-
orate: "Our close analysis of Li discloses no purpose to modify
the rule so clearly announced by section 877. ''83
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, Inc.
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, Inc. 4 marked a second
attempt to deal with the loss allocation difficulties, squarely
facing the issue of reconciling Li and the contribution statute.
In Safeway, the plaintiff brought suit against Safeway and
Nest-Kart for injuries she sustained when a shopping cart al-
legedly broke and fell on her foot. The jury found both Safeway
and Nest-Kart liable and rendered a special finding that Safe-
way was 80% at fault and Nest-Kart 20% at fault.5 Safeway
81. 62 Cal. App. 3d at 234, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 845 (emphasis supplied).
82. Id. at 236-37, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
83. Id. at 236, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 846. In addition to the questionable validity of
the settlement provisions after Li, there are other problems. It was recognized before
Li that settlements in multi-party actions were subject to abuse and collusion among
parties. The court of appeal in a 1972 decision put it bluntly: "The California legisla-
tion empowers a plaintiff, armed with a strong and lucrative claim, to settle with his
antagonists one by one, preserving for the jury the opponent with the most money and
least sympathy." River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 986,
994, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498, 503 (1972). Even the drafters recognized the problem by adding
the good faith settlement requirement. Id. at 995, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 504. However, it
would be very difficult for a non-settling defendant to show bad faith, since it is highly
unlikely that he participated in the settlement negotiations between the plaintiff and
the settling defendant. In this regard, another court of appeal observed: "Except in
rare cases of collusion or bad faith . . . a joint tortfeasor should be permitted to
negotiate settlement . . . to his own best interests." Stambaugh v. Superior Court, 62
Cal. App. 3d 231, 238, 132 Cal. Rptr. 843, 847 (1976).
84. 134 Cal. Rptr. 150 (Ct. App. 1976), hearing granted, 1 Civ. No. 39083 (Feb.
11, 1977).
85. Id. at 151.
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was found to be liable on theories of negligence and strict liabil-
ity while Nest-Kart was held liable only in strict liability." The
judgment was satisfied by Nest-Kart and Safeway according to
the proportions specified in the special findings. Safeway then
moved to increase Nest-Kart's share to 50%. After the motion
was granted, Nest-Kart appealed.
On appeal, Nest-Kart argued that the literal, equal share
rule of the contribution statute was incompatible with Li and
that it should be abandoned in favor of a system requiring
contribution in proportion to fault." The court noted that de-
spite its argument for comparative contribution, Nest-Kart did
not contend that Li also demanded the abrogation of the rule
of joint and several liability, though it makes each tortfeasor
liable for the entire judgment regardless of his percentage of
fault.88 In response to Nest-Kart's push for comparative contri-
bution, the appellate court concluded that Li did not require
alteration of the statutory rule of contribution .8
The court began its analysis by observing that Li had ex-
pressly refrained from resolving the conceptual problems that
the adoption of a system of pure comparative negligence posed
in regards to the loss allocation principles of contribution and
indemnity.10
After noting that no post-Li case had squarely confronted
the issue before it, the court turned to an examination of the
law regarding comparative contribution as it developed in
other jurisdictions. This examination disclosed two jurisdic-
tions that had adopted comparative contribution by judicial
fiat, but both had common law, non-statutory rules of contri-
bution. The court found difficulty in judicially enacting such
a system in California when faced with the clearly defined
language of the California contribution statute.'
In addition to the difficulty inherent in circumventing a
legislative command, the court enumerated two other problems
that would have to be dealt with if comparative contribution
were declared to be the law. First, the court reasoned that if
comparative contribution were the rule, equity would demand
that the named defendant be permitted to bring unnamed de-
86. Id., see note 94, infra.
87. 134 Cal. Rptr. at 151.
88. Id. at 152.
89. Id. at 154.
90. Id. at 152.
91. Id. at 153.
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fendants into the lawsuit to pick up their share of the judg-
ment. " The court was quick to note, however, that the Califor-
nia statutory law did not allow the named defendant to join
unnamed parties as of right. Similarly, the court observed that
the statutory provisions governing settlement and release
would have to be modified if comparative contribution became
the rule.9 3 The court could not conceive that a good faith settle-
ment would permit the settling defendant to escape paying his
fair share of the judgment.
In sum, although the court seemed to intimate that com-
parative contribution was a more equitable rule, like the
Stambaugh court, it refrained from directly challenging the
contribution statute. 4
American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court
The third appellate decision to confront the loss allocation
problems raised by Li was American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Supe-
rior Court.5 It should be noted that the California Supreme
Court specifically overruled the decision reached by the court
of appeal," and analysis of the appellate opinion is included
only to illustrate the conceptual difficulties Li posed in the area
of loss allocation.
92. Id. at 154. See generally V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, § 16.5.
93. 134 Cal. Rptr. at 154.
94. Nest-Kart raised a very interesting issue when it argued that Safeway was
not entitled to contribution because the defendants had not acted in pari delicto. This
argument was based on the jury's finding that Nest-Kart was liable on only a strict
liability theory while Safeway was found liable in negligence and strict liability. The
court concluded that the controlling case was Barth v. B.F. Goodrich, 15 Cal. App. 3d
137, 92 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1971). 134 Cal. Rptr. at 154. That pre-Li case held that statutory
contribution was the proper method of loss allocation between a strictly-liable tire
manufacturer and a dealer who had negligently installed it.
Exactly how that issue would be handled now is in some doubt because of the new
doctrine of equitable indemnity announced in American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior
Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 574 P.2d 763, 143 Cal. Rptr. 692 (1978). The very recent case of
Daly v. General Motors, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (Sup. Ct. 1978) held that a plaintiff's fault
may be weighed by a jury to reduce the amount of damages assessed against a strict
liability defendant. While that rule has not yet been applied in the multiple tortfeasor
context, it would be consistent to require that a negligent defendant's fault be weighed
against the "fault" of a strict liability defendant. Such an application of the rule would
be no more inscrutible to a jury than requiring it to compare a plaintiff's fault against
that of a strictly liable defendant. See generally Fleming, Foreword: Comparative
Negligence at Last-by Judicial Choice, 64 CALIF. L. Rv. 239, 242 (1976); Note,
Products Liability, Comparative Negligence, and the Allocation of Damages Among
Multiple Defendants, 50 S. CAL. L. Rv. 73 (1976).
95. 135 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1977), rev'd, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 574 P.2d 763, 143 Cal. Rptr.
692 (1978).
96. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 574 P.2d 763, 143 Cal. Rptr. 692 (1978).
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In American Motorcycle, a minor, who injured his back
while competing in an amateur motorcycle race, filed an action
through a guardian ad litem against several defendants, in-
cluding the American Motorcycle Association (AMA). 7 The
complaint charged the defendants with negligence, fraud, and
conspiracy in connection with the handling of the race.
AMA answered the complaint and attempted to cross-
complain against the Viking Motorcycle Club and the parents
of the injured plaintiff on theories of indemnity and compara-
tive negligence." After the trial court denied the motion, AMA
filed a second motion for leave to file a cross-complaint against
only the parents, one of whom was guardian ad litem. The
cross-complaint was drawn in two counts. The first alleged that
the parents negligently failed to supervise their son in consent-
ing to his participation in the race and, further, that such negli-
gence was active, while any negligence on the part of AMA was
passive.9 Thus the count sought indemnity from the parents in
the event that AMA was found liable to their son.
The second cause of action sought a declaration that the
negligence of all parties contributing to the injury, including
the parents, be considered in apportioning the liability.' ° Ac-
cordingly, the cross-complaint urged that Li be interpreted as
requiring the adoption of comparative contribution. The trial
court again denied the motion, and AMA then sought a writ of
mandate in the court of appeal to effectuate its cross-
complaint.
The issue, as formulated by the appellate court, was
whether "a named defendant [has a right] to bring persons
not named as defendants into the action by a cross-complaint
alleging the negligence of those persons and its proximate caus-
ation of the injury for which the complaint seeks to hold the
defendant-cross-complainant liable."''
After discussing the common law rule of joint and several
liability and summarizing the "limited" right of contribution
provided by statute and the "complex system of equitable in-
demnity,"'"2 the court turned to an analysis of the conse-
quences of Li. It was pointed out that Li emphatically disposed
97. 135 Cal. Rptr. at 499.
98. Id. at 499.
99. Id. at 499-500.
100. Id. at 500.
101. Id. at 498-99.
102. Id. at 500.
[Vol. 18
EQUITABLE INDEMNITY
of the all-or-nothing rule of contributory negligence by adopt-
ing "pure" comparative negligence rather than any modified
system. 03 The court then applied that analysis to the rule of
joint and several liability. It reasoned that just as the all-or-
nothing rule was eliminated as it applies to plaintiffs, so should
the all-or-nothing rule of joint and several liability be elimi-
nated as it applies to defendants. It was noted that the under-
pinning of Li was that the degree of each party's fault should
determine the extent of his liability.
Concluding that the conceptual underpinning of Li elimi-
nated the traditional basis of joint and several liability, the
court then turned to policy considerations to ascertain whether
the rule should be retained or rejected. After the court found
the approaches of other states to be inconsistent, it focused
upon what it felt was the underlying basis of California negli-
gence law. In the court's opinion the policy is one of "loss
shifting . . . socializing the loss incident to tortious con-
duct."'14 Under this concept, tort loss is shifted from the plain-
tiff to a finite social fund comprised of taxes and insurance. 05
Whenever the courts and legislators choose to shift tort losses
to the finite social fund, they are making a choice that the fund
should be used for that purpose rather than for some other
social goal.'
The court then pointed out that Li has shifted the tort loss
previously borne by a negligent plaintiff to the social fund.'
Implying that the social fund is already overburdened, the
court added that the risk of insolvency of defendants should be
borne by plaintiffs instead of by the social fund. 08 Since it
appears that the rule of joint and several liability places the
risk of insolvency of a defendant upon the social fund, the court
concluded that the rule of joint and several liability is not
103. Id.; see note 61 supra. The Li court rejected the 50% system because it
barred an injured party from recovering if he was more at fault than the defendant. In
the words of the court, "such a rule distorts the very principle it recognizes, i.e., that
persons are responsible for their acts to the extent their fault contributes to an injurious
result." 13 Cal. 3d at 828, 532 P.2d at 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875 (quoting Juenger,
Brief for Negligence Law Section of the State Bar of Michigan in Support of Compara-
tive Negligence as Amicus Curiae, Parsenson v. Construction Equipment Co., 18
WAYNE L. REv. 3, 50 (1972).
104. 135 Cal. Rptr. at 502; see Fleming, Foreword: Comparative Negligence at
Last-by Judicial Choice, 64 CALIF. L. P~v. 239, 242 (1976).
105. 135 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 502.
108. Id.
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supported by policy.' °
After indicating supporting language from Li, the court
held that the rule of joint and several liability cannot be re-
tained in a system of pure comparative negligence."' Finally,
the court criticized the holdings of Stambaugh and Nest-Kart
as failing to consider the consequences of unequal treatment of
plaintiffs and defendants in a pure fault system."'
Appellate Response Analyzed
The three appellate court cases demonstrate the frustrat-
ing conceptual struggle inherent in attempting to reconcile the
existing methods of indemnity and contribution with Li's pro-
nouncement that liability should be assessed according to
fault. Based on the fact situation before it, each court offered
its own rationale for solving the particular problem raised.
Thus, the Stambaugh court concluded that a tortfeasor
who settles in good faith cannot be brought into the subsequent
lawsuit by any remaining defendants. The continued availabil-
ity of complete discharge for a settling defendant implies that
the remaining defendant(s) will be responsible for the balance
of the damages regardless of the proportion of his fault in rela-
tion to that of the settling defendant. The court justified this
result based on the overriding policy considerations in favor of
settlement.
While the court specifically refrained from deciding
whether a defendant is liable to a plaintiff only to the extent
that his negligence caused the plaintiff's damages, language of
the case clearly indicates that the rule of joint and several
liability controls.
This holding constitutes a broad application of the contri-
bution statute since it applied the settlement provisions to the
statute to a cross-complaint that sought neither indemnity nor
contribution. Instead, the motion sought a determination of
the relative fault of the co-tortfeasors, and then a ruling that
the non-settling defendant was liable to plaintiff only to the
extent of its fault; in effect an abrogation of the rule of joint
and several liability. It does not appear that the moving party
was attempting to impose any additional liability on the set-
tling defendant. The court gave no reason for applying the
109. Id.
110. Id. at 503. Contra V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, § 16.4.
111. 135 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
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statutory bar to a motion that had very little, if anything, to
do with contribution.
The Safeway decision, in contrast, specifically dealt with
the issue raised on appeal, that is, whether Li overrides the pro
rata allocation dictated by the contribution statute. While the
court recognized that comparative contribution might be a
more equitable system, it refrained from challenging the stat-
ute. The court's refusal to challenge the statute indicated that
a judicial implementation of a system of loss allocation based
on fault would have to take an alternate approach. One possi-
bility was hinted at by the court when it acknowledged that
joint and several liability was the basic concept underlying the
statute. " Eliminating the rule would eliminate the basis of the
statute and allow the court to move in other directions. An-
other remaining possibility was a judicial modification of the
doctrine of implied indemnity.
The Safeway court also realized that the adoption of a
system of comparative contribution would have broad statu-
tory implications beyond mere modification of loss allocation
principles. To enable the system to function both equitably in
regards to each defendant and consistently in regards to Li, the
court reasoned that the statutory provisions governing joinder,
settlement, and release would have to be reconsidered.
The court of appeal opinion in American Motorcycle,
which was subsequently overruled by the California Supreme
Court, rejected the rule of joint and several liability, reasoning
that its all-or-nothing outcome was inconsistent with the prin-
ciple of comparative fault. The court went a step further by
maintaining in dicta that plaintiffs should bear the risk of in-
solvency of a defendant." 3 This view was in total opposition to
the policy of compensating plaintiffs.
Since each court's fact situation presented different issues,
none of the decisions considered the full spectrum of complex
problems posed by the conflict between the existing methods
of loss allocation and the concept of pure comparative fault. To
obviate the need for continued piecemeal resolution of the diffi-
culties involved, the California Supreme Court took a broad
approach in its attempt to reconcile the conflict.
112. See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
113. 135 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
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POST-LI PROBLEMS: THE SUPREME COURT'S RESPONSE
The Decision
In purporting to dispose of some of the numerous multiple
party issues "lurking in the background," the California Su-
preme Court's opinion in American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Supe-
rior Court"4 marked its first major statement on the principles
of comparative negligence since Li. The decision extends the
rule of partial indemnity discussed earlier with respect to
Herrero and Dole to all multiple tortfeasor cases involving neg-
ligence, gives defendants the right to join all potential defen-
dants in the lawsuit, but retains the rule of joint and several
liability as well as the settlement set-off provisions set forth in
the contribution statute. While the decision creates some con-
ceptual difficulties, it nevertheless resolves some of the prob-
lems described in the previous sections.
In explaining the effect of comparative negligence on prin-
ciples of loss allocation among multiple defendants, the court
first addressed the rule of joint and several liability. After dis-
cussing the various contexts in which the term joint and several
liability has been utilized,"5 the court concluded that in the
concurrent tortfeasor context the rule dictates that "a negli-
gent tortfeasor is generally liable for all damages of which his
negligence is a proximate cause.""' 6 In response to AMA's argu-
ment that Li provides a method of allocating loss on the basis
of comparative fault, thus making damages divisible, the court
said that "the simple feasibility of apportioning fault on a com-
parative negligence basis does not render an indivisible injury
'divisible' for purposes of the joint and several liability rule."" 7
The court further explained that "it is simply impossible to
determine whether or not a particular tortfeasor's negligence,
acting alone, would have caused the same injury.""' The court
concluded that although a percentage of relative fault may be
assigned to a particular tortfeasor, it does not render an injury
divisible.
In opposing retention of the foregoing rule, the American
Motorcycle Association (AMA) argued that after Li, plaintiffs
were no longer "innocent.""' The court responded by pointing
114. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 574 P.2d 763, 143 Cal. Rptr. 692 (1978).
115. Id. at 587, 574 P.2d at 768, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
116. Id. at 586, 574 P.2d at 767, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 696.





out that the rule protects innocent plaintiffs from having to
bear the portion of loss attributable to an insolvent defendant.
With regard to culpable plaintiffs, the court maintained that
a plaintiffs "negligence" is distinct from that of a defendant's
in that it does not create a risk of harm to others, but merely a
risk of self-harm.20
Finally, the court, citing the famous Summers v. Tice 2 1
decision, reiterated the established policy favoring full com-
pensation to plaintiffs over the equitable allocation of loss
among defendants. 2 2 The court then concluded that the rule of
joint and several liability should be retained, adding that most
jurisdictions adopting comparative negligence have retained
the rule.
The next portion of the decision expanded the doctrine of
equitable indemnity in multiple tortfeasor actions and specifi-
cally approved partial indemnity as a method of apportioning
damages. The court began its analysis by tracing the common
law development of indemnity as an all-or-nothing proposition,
and the difficulties encountered by the courts in trying to arrive
at a suitable test to distinguish the negligence of indemnitees
and indemnitors. 1 3 The court believed that the primary diffi-
culty with the doctrine was its all-or-nothing nature, which it
held was inconsistent with the principles of comparative negli-
gence. Relying on the precedent set by Dole24 and its pro-
geny,125 the court concluded "that the current equitable in-
demnity rule should be modified to permit a concurrent tort-
feasor to obtain partial indemnity from other concurrent tort-
feasors on a comparative fault basis.' '2
Following this discussion, the opinion focused on the rela-
tionship between the new doctrine of equitable indemnity and
the contribution statute. First, the court rejected an argument
that California's preexisting contribution statute precluded
judicial development of comparative indemnity. The court
120. Id. at 589-90, 574 P.2d at 769-70, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 698-99.
121. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
122. One court of appeal stated: "The equities thus considered are those of the
wrongdoers among themselves and at all times are subject to the greater 'equity'
existing in favor of the innocent injured party." Thornton v. Luce, 209 Cal. App. 2d
542, 552, 26 Cal. Rptr. 393, 399 (1962).
123. 20 Cal. 3d at 595, 574 P.2d at 773, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 702.
124. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
125. Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25, 286 N.E.2d 241, 334
N.Y.S.2d 851 (1972).
126. 20 Cal. 3d at 599, 574 P.2d at 776, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 705.
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pointed out that the New York Court of Appeals in Dole'7
adopted partial indemnity despite the existence of a similar
contribution statute in that jurisdiction. The court further rea-
soned that since the primary legislative purpose of the statute
was to lessen the harshness of the common law bar to allocation
of loss among defendants, it was free to adopt a broader com-
mon law doctrine of indemnity consistent with that goal.' 28
Additionally, the court pointed out that, unlike the New York
statute, the California legislation expressly preserved the right
of indemnity, and that it also required that contribution be
"administered in accordance with the principles of equity.' 29
The court concluded that the statute did not preclude it from
developing a parallel, albeit more expansive, common law doc-
trine.
The court then set forth its view of the relationship be-
tween comparative indemnity and the settlement provisions of
the contribution statute. The statute embodies a strong public
policy favoring settlement of litigation by providing incentives
for settlement. Any defendant who settles in good faith is dis-
charged from liability to any other defendant, and plaintiffs
recovery from remaining defendants is set off by the amount
of the settlement rather than by settling defendant's pro rata
share. Thus, when one defendant settles there is considerable
pressure placed on the remaining defendants to settle or risk
paying a very large sum in the event that damages as deter-
mined during trial are high, which sum is set off by only the
dollar amount of the settlement. Amici urged that these incen-
tives would be abrogated by the adoption of comparative in-
demnity.'30 The court responded by incorporating these statu-
tory settlement provisions into its new doctrine.' 3'
The final section of the opinion discussed the right of a
defendant to cross-complain against a potential co-tortfeasor
who was not joined by the plaintiff. Contrary to the appellate
court in Safeway, the supreme court found explicit statutory
authority for the proposition that a defendant could cross-
complain as of right against an alleged co-tortfeasor 3 2
127. Id. at 601 n.6, 574 P.2d at 777 n.6, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 706 n.6.
128. Id. at n.7, 574 P.2d at 777 n.7, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 706 n.7.
129. Id. at 603, 574 P.2d at 778, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 707.
130. See id. at 604, 574 P.2d at 779, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 708; text accompanying
note 67 supra.
131. 20 Cal. 3d at 604, 574 P.2d at 779, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 702.
132. The court pointed out that under CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 428.10, a defen-
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In response to the argument that allowing such a joinder
would tend to complicate the issues and deprive plaintiff of the
right to control the size and scope of the litigation, the court
observed that section 1048(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure
empowers a trial court to bifurcate the proceeding by ordering
separate trials "in furtherance of convenience or to avoid preju-
dice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition
and economy."'' However, the court concluded that bifurca-
tion would probably be impracticable in cases involving culpa-
ble plaintiffs.
Nonetheless, having already noted that under the compar-
ative negligence doctrine a plaintiffs recovery should be
diminished only by that proportion which the plaintiffs
negligence bears to that of all tortfeasors, we think it only
fair that a defendant who may be jointly and severally
liable for all of plaintiffs damages be permitted to bring
other concurrent tortfeasors into the suit.'3'
Accordingly, the court determined that a defendant may
file a cross-complaint against a concurrent tortfeasor for partial
indemnity even if the latter has not been joined by the plain-
tiff. Applying this rule to the instant case, the court held that
since AMA sufficiently alleged a cause of action for negligence
and partial indemnity against plaintiff's parents, the trial
court should have granted AMA's motion for leave to file the
cross-complaint. ,3
Impact of the Decision
The opinion in American Motorcycle takes a large stride
towards clearing up the ambiguities of multiple defendant liti-
gation which arose in the wake of Li. Adopting the doctrine of
comparative partial indemnity, which additionally gives defen-
dants the right to join other potential concurrent tortfeasors in
the lawsuit, is entirely consistent with California's pure fault
system, and constitutes a badly needed response to this pre-
may file a cross-complaint setting forth . (b) any cause of action he
has against a person alleged to be liable thereon, whether or not such
person is already a party to the action, if the cause of action... (1) arises
out of the same transaction . .. [or] occurrence .. . as the cause
brought against him or (2) asserts a claim ...in the . ..controversy
which is subject of the cause brought against him.
133. 20 Cal. 3d at 606, 574 P.2d at 781, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 704.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 607, 574 P.2d at 781, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 710.
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viously unsettled and turbulent area of law. Yet the court, held
back by what it viewed as compelling policy considerations,
failed to carry the concept of pure fault through to its inescapa-
ble conclusion when it incorporated both the rule of joint and
several liability and the settlement provisions of the current
contribution statute into the system of comparative indemnity.
In retaining the rule of joint and several liability the court
reiterated a long established policy favoring the right of plain-
tiffs to recover the total amount of the judgment from any of
several defendants, leaving the latter to divvy up the losses
among themselves.' 3 The difficulty with this concept in a post-
Li context, as pointed out by Justice Clark in his dissent, is
that it provides for distribution of loss on a basis besides pure
fault. 37 For example, recall the situation involving the pedes-
trian who was injured by a speeding motorist in a crosswalk
where the traffic signal malfunctioned. Suppose that plaintiff
failed to look at the signal before entering the intersection, and
that, as a result, the plaintiff was adjudicated 20% at fault, the
motorist 50% and the city 30%. If the motorist was uninsured
and insolvent or not subject to the jurisdiction of the court, the
joint and several liability rule would require the city to pay 80%
of the damages. Under the American Motorcycle formulation,
the plaintiff would not be required to share in the risk that any
tortfeasor is insolvent or unavailable, even though his negli-
gence accounted for part of the loss.'3
In support of its retention of the rule, the court reasoned
that the plaintiff's negligence is not "negligent" in that it does
not create a risk of harm to others. Presumably, this would be
true even where plaintiff's fault exceeds 50%. 31 Such a conclu-
sion is strained for two reasons. 4 ' First, a plaintiff's negligence
may well cause injury to another as well as to himself, as in the
case of multiple car accidents. Liability should be allocated on
the basis of fault and not on the basis of whether a litigant is
called a plaintiff or a cross-complainant. It is a hasty conclu-
sion to hold as a matter of law that a plaintiff's fault is not
negligent. Secondly, the system of pure comparative negligence
purports to allocate loss on the basis of fault as determined by
the jury. It assumes that juries are capable of making such
136. Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 88, 199 P.2d 1, 5 (1948).
137. See 20 Cal. 3d at 609, 574 P.2d at 782, 143 Cal. Rptr. 711.
138. See also id. at 610, 574 P.2d at 783, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
139. See id.
140. See also id. at 610-13, 574 P.2d at 783-85, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 712-14.
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decisions. By retaining the rule of joint and several liability,
the American Motorcycle court prevents the jury from further
dividing the fault in those situations where a defendant is insol-
vent or unavailable. Based only on the concept of proximate
cause, which in itself defies simple application, the court's view
deprives the jury of performing a function it is equipped to
handle and concludes that an injury is not further divisible.
A better rule, more consistent with Li, would divide the
insolvent defendant's share of damages among the remaining
litigants in proportion to their relative fault. Thus, in the ex-
ample of the injured pedestrian, if the motorist were insolvent
the city would pay 60% of the total damages while the plaintiff
would be responsible for 40% instead of the city paying the
entire 80% combined fault of all defendants. Under this system
an innocent plaintiff would be completely protected, since he
would still recover all damages from the solvent defendant.
To add to the difficulties created by retaining joint and
several liability, the court chose to incorporate the settlement
provisions of California's contribution statute into its new equi-
table indemnity doctrine. While the court apparently adopted
partial indemnity to get around the acknowledged injustice of
requiring each defendant to pay a pro rata share of damages
under the contribution scheme, the court has paved the way for
far greater inequities.
Under the statute, a good faith settlement completely re-
leases the settling defendant from further liability. Under the
court's formulation in American Motorcycle, a settlement
serves only to reduce the plaintiff's later recovery by the
amount of the settlement figure. These factors can combine to
generate a result where a nonsettling defendant is held liable
for a sum well in excess of his proportion of the fault. For
example, suppose A and B combine to injure C in an auto
accident. Prior to trial, C settles with A for $25,000. Later, at
trial, C recovers a $100,000 judgment as a result of the accident
for which the jury held A 75% responsible and B 25% responsi-
ble. Despite being only 25% at fault, B must now come up with
$75,000. Seemingly in direct contravention of Li, B is forced to
pay damages in excess of his proportion of fault. Alternatively,
but equally out of line with Li, B, faced with the foregoing
possibility of being hung out to dry at trial, might well settle
for a figure that is also incommensurate with his fault.
Tactically then, American Motorcycle has put a great
weapon in the plaintiff's arsenal. One can readily conceive of
a plaintiff who willingly settles for a very low sum with a rela-
19781
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
tively poor defendant whose potential fault is quite high, while
refusing to do the same with a corporate or insurance company
defendant who the plaintiff knows will remain liable for the
balance of the judgment. Again, faced with this result, the
corporate defendant may be forced to settle for a figure that
proportionately is well in excess of its share of the fault. A
better system would require the defendants to agree to a total
settlement with plaintiff. In this manner plaintiff would be
unable to utilize the above described tactic, and the settlement
of each defendant would more likely correspond to his share of
the fault. In the event that defendants were unable to reach a
satisfactory agreement among themselves or with the plaintiff,
the parties would be brought into court in a single action.''
While it is arguable that more cases would further clog our
already overcrowded dockets, the goal of allocating loss on a
pure fault basis would be served.
Despite the problems that arise from the American
Motorcycle decision, the court twice emphasized the evolving
nature of equitable indemnity, thus leaving room for future
judicial development and clarification.' Some issues are far
from settled; and with the continuing debate in the legislature
over no-fault and other proposed tort reforms, as well as the
continuing onslaught of appeals, futher changes in this area
may be expected.
CONCLUSION
The traditionally rigid methods of allocating tort losses
among defendants embodied in the doctrines of contribution
and indemnity became unworkable with the judicial adoption
of comparative negligence since they did not apportion liability
on the basis of fault. Additionally, both systems were flawed
in other respects and seemed to invite inequitable loss alloca-
tions. As the California courts of appeal began reaching incon-
sistent solutions to the problems raised, it became apparent
that the guidance of the California high court was needed.
The California Supreme Court reconciled some of these
difficulties in its recent judicial enactment of partial equitable
141. Professor Prosser stated his view on this alternative: "The only completely
satisfactory method of dealing with the [multiple party] situation is to bring all the
parties into court in a single action, to determine the damages sustained by each, and
to require that each bear a proportion of the loss according to his fault." Prosser,
Comparative Negligence, 41 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 33 (1953).
142. 20 Cal. 3d at 597, 603, 574 P.2d at 774-75, 779, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 703-04, 707.
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indemnity. By giving named defendants the right to join third-
party defendants in an action for determination of the relative
fault and resultant liability of the parties, the American
Motorcycle decision comports with the system of pure compar-
ative fault.
Yet, American Motorcycle exhibits some troubling concep-
tual inconsistencies resulting from its retention of the rule of
joint and several liability and the settlement provisions of the
contribution statute. Each was incorporated into the newly
announced doctrine of equitable indemnity to protect plaintiffs
and to encouarge settlements, yet both fail to square with the
concept of pure fault. This dilemma suggests a need for further
development and clarification of the problems associated with
multiple defendant litigation.'
John J. Cheap, Jr.
143. This comment was based in part on an essay which was awarded a tie for
third place in June, 1977 in a national legal essay contest sponsored by the Federation
of Insurance Counsel Foundation. The author gratefully acknowledges the Federation's
permission to reprint portions of the essay.
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